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MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE. [This entry contains

two subentries:
Legal Foundations
Modern Practice]
LEGAL FOUNDATIONS

The Islamic view of women, gender relations, marriage,
and divorce differs radically from those common to most
Jahiliyah (pre-Islamic) tribes of Arabia. In the period
prior to Islam, patriarchy was generally on the rise in the
area and the surrounding Roman and Persian Empires.
In Arabia, female infanticide was a common Jahiliyah
practice that Islam prohibited. Women were treated as
chattel transferable upon the death of the husband to his
son. They had no inheritance rights. Furthermore, a male
member of their family could force them to transfer any
property they may own to him by simply imprisoning
them at home ( 'adhl). All these practices were explicitly
prohibited by the Qur'an. Islam introduced a new regard
for women and family life, and it regulated divorce to
make it more equitable.
The Qur' anic view of marriage and divorce can be
summed up as "staying together on equitable terms or
separating with kindness:' The Qur' an also describes the
marriage contract as mithaqan ghalithan (a solemn cov
enant). The Prophet MulJammad states that the marriage
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contract is the contract most worthy of fulfillment, and
describes divorce as the most hated permissible act in
the sight of God. Many jurists noted that God placed
the marriage contract within the category of 'ibiidat
(which relate to God's worship), and not within the cat
egory of mu 'iimaliit, where contracts are usually placed.
From the days of the Prophet, the marriage contract was
used to articulate the rights and stipulations prospective
wives required from their husbands, and hence offered a
unique vehicle for the protection of women. "TT1is vehicle
was part of an elaborate structure based on the Qur' an,
the Prophet's sunnah (sayings and example), and subse
quent juristic interpretations.
The Qur' an is the foundation of all Islamic laws,
including laws of marriage and divorce. Where a matter
is not addressed specifically there, or where the applica
tion of a Qur'anic verse to a certain situation permits
several reasonable interpretations, jurists look to the
Prophet's sunnah for additional guidance. Where neither
the Qur' an nor sunnah address a matter explicitly, jurists
resort to ijtihiid, a system of reasoning and interpretation
for which they have articulated several basic principles,
one of which is that laws may change with time, place,
and circumstances. "TT1is is what is happening today in
Muslim countries. Just as the ancient ijtihiid of jurists
was significantly influenced by their milieu, so is mod
ern ijtihiid. Local gender, class, and political preferences
have always help shape the jurists' worldview, which was
reflected in the resulting jurisprudence. Today, existing
jurisprudence needs to be revised to make it suitable for
modern societies.
Originally, Muslim family law was not codified. Judges
who were faced with a new issue sought guidance from
the Qur' an, sunnah, and the ijtihiid of recognized jurists.
When necessary, they also relied on their own ijtiluid.
Thus a common-law tradition developed in early Islamic
societies. 'TT1is tradition was pluralistic in that it permit
ted many schools of thought to thrive side by side in the
same community, and members of the community were
free to choose the school of thought that would govern
their lives. Since there are many jurisprudential differ
ences among the schools of thought, rulings under the
various schools at times varied significantly. These varia
tions, however, are fully acceptable in Islam. Differences
of opinion were viewed as a sign of divine mercy, because
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they accommodate a wide variety of human needs and
circumstances, even in the same community.
Codification. Later European influence in the Muslim
world led many countries to codify their laws. Codifica
tion led to the choice of a single official school of thought
as its basis. By adopting official schools of thought, mod
ern states significantly weakened the traditional pluralis
tic Islamic legal tradition. While most countries in the
Middle East and North Africa have codified their laws,
some Gulf countries, such as Bahrain and Saudi Arabia,
continue to follow a weak form of the common-law tra
dition. Although they have not codified their family laws,
they have nevertheless selected an official school of
thought. In these jurisdictions, cases are not published,
so judges tend not to be fully aware of relevant local prec
edents. As a result, judgments based on the same school
of thought sometimes vary significantly even in similar
circumstances. This situation created a problem of incon
sistency that has elicited calls for codification.
One controversial area of jurisprudence across the
modern Muslim world relates to the requirement of wali.
'TI1ree of the major schools (Maliki, I:Ianbali, and Shafi'i)
agree that a Muslim woman needs a waif (guardian, usu
ally her father) in order to marry. But a well-established
line of thought in another school, the I:Ianafi, views the
mature woman who has reached puberty as capable of
contracting her own marriage, with the waif playing a
merely advisory role. l:lanafi jurisdictions have tradi
tionally ignored this aspect of I:Ianafi jurisprudence,
but Morocco, a Malild jurisdiction, abandoned the waif
requirement in an expansive reform of its family law pro
mulgated in 2004.
Ja'faris (Twelver Shi'is) view a mature woman who
has reached puberty, whether a virgin or otherwise, as a
full legal entity coequal with her male counterpart. She is
considered legally competent to make her own marriage
decisions and even to conclude her own marriage con
tract, regardless of her father's approval and the social
station of the prospective husband.
One reason for the preponderance of patriarchal
interpretations in the Islamic juristic tradition is the
exclusion of women from judicial and religious roles.
This exclusion flies in the face of early precedents. For
example, 'A'ishah, the wife of the Prophet, and other
Muslim women played leading roles in the transmission

of sunnah and the interpretation of law. Based on such
precedents, scholars at al-Azhar, a major center of Islamic
learning in Cairo, provided in 2007 an opinion favoring
significant expansion of the scope of judicial roles avail
able to women. Years before that, al-Azhar University
had admitted women. In Morocco, the first class of
female religious teachers (murshidiit) graduated in 2006.
Generally, women scholars around the Muslim world are
increasing in number and, together with male scholars,
are discarding outdated patriarchal assumptions. As a
result, the long-term effect that the exclusion of women
has had on Islamic jurisprudence, especially in the area
of family law, is now being reversed.
Polygyny. For example, the 2004 Moroccan amend
ments finally recognized the wife's right to repudiate her
husband, if he had transferred that right to her (tamlfk).
Another example is that of polygyny. All schools of
thought have interpreted the Qur' an as permitting polyg
yny as long as certain conditions of fairness are observed.
The Tunisian Personal Status Code (1956, as amended)
prohibits it. This prohibition, along with other departures
like the one discussed above, has been viewed by many as
a reflection of Western colonial influence. Tunisian jurists
in fact relied on the Qur' an, sunnah, and major secondary
sources in developing their arguments for prohibiting
polygyny. It is, however, probably true that the Tunisian
desire to reexamine its position on this issue was moti
vated by external Western influence. W hile Morocco has
not prohibited polygyny, recent amendments to its code
have imposed stringent conditions on polygynous mar
riages by using alternative traditional jurisprudence.
Another more effective approach to barring polygyny
would be for the woman to stipulate in the marriage con
tract that her prospective husband may not marry a sec
ond wife. Unfortunately, the validity and effectiveness of
this stipulation varies with the school of thought. Shafi'is,
for example, reject it as contrary to marital rights flowing
from the marriage contract, but they view the rest of the
contract containing the stipulation as valid. This result is
quite harsh for a woman bent on protec ting her marriage
from polygyny.
�lanafis also regard this condition as null and void, but
as an inducement for women to marry, they recognize
the validity of a condition in the marriage contract that
reserves for the woman the right to divorce her husband
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at her option. Maliki:s accept as valid the condition not to
take a second wife, but they discourage it.Under the 2004
amendments to the Moroccan code, the woman's right to
include such a stipulation in the marriage contract has
been recognized. In the absence of such stipulation, the
code requires the informed consent of both wives, and
gives the first wife the right to divorce for harm.
Divorce. Under all schools of thought, a woman may
obtain divorce by returning to her husband her rnahr
(marital gift), or by dropping all claims to it, but she is
also required to acquire her husband's consent to her
action. This form of divorce, called khul ', is based on a
prophetic precedent. The requirement to refund the
rnahr may impose a hardship on a woman of modest
means if she has already expended her marital gift, but it
guards against the woman profiteering through mar
riage. The consent requirement, however, presents a more
significant and often insurmountable obstacle to khul'.
It has also been used by husbands for profiteering. After
careful review of early precedents, al-Azhar produced an
opinion that eliminated the consent requirement as
unwarranted. Relying on this opinion, the Egyptian Code
was revised in 2000. As a result, khul ' has become a more
viable exit strategy for married women in these jurisdic
tions. Alternatively, women may request a judicial
divorce, which can be a lengthy procedure but tends to
preserve for the woman her rnahr rights.
One line of thought among I:Janbali:s is closest to that
of the Prophet in its treatment of the marriage stipula
tion barring the husband from taking a second wife. The
Prophet stated that one's 'uhud (contractual promises or
undertakings) must be fulfilled and that the 'uhud most
worthy of fulfillment are those of the marriage contract.
I:Janbalis view as valid this stipulation and all other
marital contract stipulations which are not incompatible
with Islamic law or the object of marriage. Furthermore,
they also signal the seriousness of violating such 'uhud
by giving the party whose marriage stipulation has been
violated the option of voiding the marriage (faskh). By
contrast, I:Janafis, for example, specify a limited mon
etary remedy for such violations.
Other laws relating, for example, to rnut'ah (a form of
temporary marriage accepted by Ja 'faris), spousal main
tenance, the ability of the wife to work outside her home,
her financial rights, the role of the husband in the family,

the duties of the wife in a marriage, and child custody,
have posed challenging questions to Muslim jurists in
modern societies. In response, a movement to reinvigo
rate ijtihiid and modernize family law in accordance with
the Qur'an and sunnah is taking root around the Muslim
world, and it includes capable women jurists.
[See also Family; Family Law; Mut'ah; Polygyny; and
Women and Islam, subentry on Role and Status of
Women.]
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MODERN PRACTICE

Rules and procedures regarding marriage and divorce
are stipulated in the Qur'an and �zadzth (Prophetic tradi
tion) and regulated through Islamic law. Laws relating to
marriage and divorce are thus part of the body of Islamic
personal status law, the only aspect of Islamic law that
has been retained nearly intact at the beginning of the
twenty-first century.
Islamic Legal Requirements. Marriage in Islamic
law is formalized by a contract (nikii�z) between the two
principals or their proxies. The contractual nature of an
Islamic marriage reflects Islam's outlook on marriage as
a civil contract-not a religious sacrament-between
two parties, which legalizes sexual relations and confers

